Universities across the pond find that even the humble fruit fly can be a sensitive export

The university was charged with making 42 unlicensed exports of fruit flies to non-U.S. research institutions, which had an aggregate value of only $580.44. These particular fruit flies were genetically modified to produce the type A subunit of a controlled toxin (ricin).

Indiana is one of the most substantial providers of fruit fly stocks. They are valued for their useful DNA code and, being quick breeders, they are used by researchers to investigate disease development. This particular modification is helpful in ablating cells.

The ricin toxin is controlled because of its potential use in biological warfare. Moreover, any 'genetically modified organism that contains' ricin, or any subunit thereof, is controlled for similar reasons. The modified fruit flies contained a subunit of ricin, and hence their export required an advance license. This result would be identical if the export had been from the UK, as both countries are members of the Australia Group against chemical and biological weapon proliferation.

These particular exports, however, did not actually increase the threat of biological warfare, as the protein expressed by the ricin A gene was admittedly harmless (it is found in barley, for example). Toxicity to humans only arises when both the ricin A and B protein chains are present.

Indiana notified the U.S Government voluntarily of its infraction. It avoided a monetary penalty by agreeing to provide further internal export control training and to describe its experience to a forum of stock centre directors and to the Association of University Export Control Officers. Indiana's settlement with the U.S Government follows a similar enforcement against Princeton University in 2021.

This case and the resulting action taken by the U.S government demonstrates that:

• Universities' exports of goods can be as problematic as their more frequent exports of technology
• Their export of goods is not entitled to be excused as being integral to basic scientific research
• Particular goods may be controlled for biological weapons reasons even though they are not themselves pathogenic
• No de minimis threshold to enforcement exists

Although university administrators are more concerned about unlicensed exports of intangible technology (and rightfully so), they should also screen material transfer agreements with foreign counterparties to ensure their compliance with export controls - even those for microscopic items and tiny payments.

For more information, please contact Thomas Dick in our Corporate team on 07968 559 217, or complete the form below.