In the case of Mercer v Alternative Future Group, Mrs Mercer was employed by Alternative Future Group (AFG). She was a workplace representative for the trade union Unison, and was involved in planning and organising a series of strikes in 2019. She was subsequently suspended by AFG and disciplined, receiving a first written warning for abandoning her shift.
Mrs Mercer claimed she had been subjected to detriment (suspension and disciplinary action) contrary to section 146 TULRCA for participating in the activities of a trade union. We previously reported on the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decision in the case, which was subsequently followed in another EAT decision in the case of Ryanair DAC v Morais.
There is a complicated background to the Court of Appeal decision, which requires a brief explanation of the relevant rights set out in TULRCA:
If an employer breaches section 146, the Tribunal may award the employee compensation considered just and equitable in the circumstances.
The Court of Appeal held that section 146 does not protect workers from detriment for taking part in industrial action. This decision reverses the earlier EAT decision and restores the decision of the Employment Tribunal before it.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the rules concerning the treatment of workers who have taken part in industrial action are set out elsewhere in TULRCA. What is meant by 'trade union activities' for the purposes of section 146 therefore excludes industrial action.
The lack of protection against detriment for participating in industrial action potentially puts the UK in breach of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides a qualified right to freedom of association and assembly.
However, it is not possible to 'read down' section 146 to include protection against detriment for participating in industrial action, in order to plug the gap identified in the protection afforded under TULRCA. To do so would create judicial legislation, which would be impermissible. The Court of Appeal observed the case raises important policy issues which should be left to the Government to determine.
This decision provides clarity on the question of the scope of protection afforded under section 146. However, it should not be interpreted by employers as a licence to subject staff to detriment short of dismissal for participating in industrial action given the Court of Appeal's comments around the breach of Article 11.